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      <record key="001" att1="001" value="166775" att2="166775">001   166775</record>
      <field key="037" subkey="x">englisch</field>
      <field key="050" subkey="x">Forschungsbericht</field>
      <field key="076" subkey="">Ökonomie</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="y">http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/eco/es-208.pdf</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="z">Fisher, Walter H. - et al., Pension Reform and Labor Market Incentives (pdf)</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="y">http://ideas.repec.org/p/ihs/ihsesp/208.html</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="z">Institute for Advanced Studies. Economics Series; 208 (RePEc)</field>
      <field key="100" subkey="">Fisher, Walter H.</field>
      <field key="103" subkey="">Department of Economics and Finance, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, Austria</field>
      <field key="104" subkey="a">Keuschnigg, Christian</field>
      <field key="107" subkey="">University of St. Gallen (IFF-HSG) and CEPR and CESifo</field>
      <field key="331" subkey="">Pension Reform and Labor Market Incentives</field>
      <field key="403" subkey="">1. Ed.</field>
      <field key="410" subkey="">Wien</field>
      <field key="412" subkey="">Institut für Höhere Studien</field>
      <field key="425" subkey="">2007, May</field>
      <field key="433" subkey="">40 pp.</field>
      <field key="451" subkey="">Institut für Höhere Studien; Reihe Ökonomie; 208</field>
      <field key="451" subkey="h">Kunst, Robert M. (Ed.) ; Fisher, Walter (Assoc. Ed.) ; Ritzberger, Klaus (Assoc. Ed.)</field>
      <field key="461" subkey="">Economics Series</field>
      <field key="517" subkey="c">from the Table of Contents: Introduction; The Model; Efficiency of Public Pensions; Parametric Pension Reform; Conclusion;</field>
      <field key="App" subkey="e">ndix; References;</field>
      <field key="542" subkey="">1605-7996</field>
      <field key="544" subkey="">IHSES 208</field>
      <field key="700" subkey="">H55</field>
      <field key="700" subkey="">J26</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Pension reform</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Retirement</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Hours worked</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Tax benefit link</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Actuarial adjustment</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Excess burden</field>
      <field key="753" subkey="">Abstract: This paper investigates how parametric reform in a pay-as-you-go pension system with a tax benefit link affects</field>
      <field key="ret" subkey="i">rement incentives and work incentives of prime-age workers. We find that postponed retirement tends to harm incentives of</field>
      <field key="pri" subkey="m">e-age workers in the presence of a tax benefit link, thereby creating a policy trade-off in stimulating aggregate labor</field>
      <field key="sup" subkey="p">ly. We show how several popular reform scenarios are geared either towards young or old workers, or, indeed, both groups</field>
      <field key="und" subkey="e">r appropriate conditions. We also provide a sharp characterization of the excess burden of pension insurance and show how it</field>
      <field key="dep" subkey="e">nds on the behavioral supply elasticities on the extensive and intensive margins and the effective tax rates implicit in</field>
      <field key="con" subkey="t">ribution rates.;</field>
    </SEQUENTIAL>
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