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      <record key="001" att1="001" value="LIB911047405" att2="LIB911047405">001   LIB911047405</record>
      <field key="037" subkey="x">englisch</field>
      <field key="050" subkey="x">Forschungsbericht</field>
      <field key="076" subkey="">Ökonomie</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="y">http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/eco/es-67.pdf</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="z">Stark, Oded, Siblings, Strangers, and the Surge of Altruism (pdf)</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="y">http://ideas.repec.org/p/ihs/ihsesp/67.html</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="z">Institute for Advanced Studies. Economics Series; 67 (RePEc)</field>
      <field key="100" subkey="">Stark, Oded</field>
      <field key="103" subkey="">Department of Economics, University of Oslo</field>
      <field key="331" subkey="">Siblings, Strangers, and the Surge of Altruism</field>
      <field key="403" subkey="">1. Ed.</field>
      <field key="410" subkey="">Wien</field>
      <field key="412" subkey="">Institut für Höhere Studien</field>
      <field key="425" subkey="">1999, June</field>
      <field key="433" subkey="">10 pp.</field>
      <field key="451" subkey="">Institut für Höhere Studien; Reihe Ökonomie; 67</field>
      <field key="451" subkey="h">Kunst, Robert M. (Ed.) ; Fisher, Walter (Ed.) ; Ritzberger, Klaus (Ed.)</field>
      <field key="461" subkey="">Economics Series</field>
      <field key="517" subkey="c">from the Table of Contents: Introduction; The game and the payoffs; The rule of imitation; The formation of couples; The outcome;</field>
      <field key="Exp" subkey="l">aining the outcome; Bringing in strangers; Conclusion;</field>
      <field key="544" subkey="">IHSES 67</field>
      <field key="700" subkey="">A13</field>
      <field key="700" subkey="">D64</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Evolution of altruism</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">One-shot prisoner's dilemma game</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Siblings and strangers</field>
      <field key="753" subkey="">Abstract: We demonstrate how altruism can surge in a population of nonaltruists. We assume that each individual plays a one-shot</field>
      <field key="pri" subkey="s">oner's dilemma game with his or her sibling, or with a stranger, and that the probability that an individual survives to</field>
      <field key="rep" subkey="r">oduce is proportional to his or her payoff in this game. We model the formation of couples and the rule of imitation of</field>
      <field key="par" subkey="e">nts and of nonparents. We then ask what happens to the proportion of altruists in the population. We specify a case where the</field>
      <field key="uni" subkey="q">ue and stable equilibrium is one in which the entire population will consist of altruists.;</field>
    </SEQUENTIAL>
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