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      <record key="001" att1="001" value="LIB911001806" att2="LIB911001806">001   LIB911001806</record>
      <field key="037" subkey="x">englisch</field>
      <field key="050" subkey="x">Forschungsbericht</field>
      <field key="076" subkey="">Formalwissenschaft</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="y">http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/eco/es-64.pdf</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="z">Okada, Akiro - et al., Inefficiency and Social Exclusion in a Coalition Formation Game (pdf)</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="y">http://ideas.repec.org/p/ihs/ihsesp/64.html</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="z">Institute for Advanced Studies. Economics Series; 64 (RePEc)</field>
      <field key="100" subkey="">Okada, Akiro</field>
      <field key="103" subkey="">Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University</field>
      <field key="104" subkey="a">Riedl, Arno</field>
      <field key="107" subkey="">Department of Economics and Econometrics, University of Amsterdam</field>
      <field key="331" subkey="">Inefficiency and Social Exclusion in a Coalition Formation Game</field>
      <field key="335" subkey="">Experimental Evidence</field>
      <field key="403" subkey="">1. Ed.</field>
      <field key="410" subkey="">Wien</field>
      <field key="412" subkey="">Institut für Höhere Studien</field>
      <field key="425" subkey="">1999, April</field>
      <field key="433" subkey="">29 pp.</field>
      <field key="451" subkey="">Institut für Höhere Studien; Reihe Ökonomie; 64</field>
      <field key="451" subkey="h">Kunst, Robert M. (Ed.) ; Fisher, Walter (Ed.) ; Ritzberger, Klaus (Ed.)</field>
      <field key="461" subkey="">Economics Series</field>
      <field key="517" subkey="c">from the Table of Contents: Introduction; The Game and Behavioral Hypotheses; Experimental Setup; Experimental Results;</field>
      <field key="Con" subkey="c">lusions;</field>
      <field key="544" subkey="">IHSES 64</field>
      <field key="700" subkey="">A13</field>
      <field key="700" subkey="">C91</field>
      <field key="700" subkey="">D61</field>
      <field key="700" subkey="">D63</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Coalition formation</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Inefficiency</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Reciprocity</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Social exclusion</field>
      <field key="753" subkey="">Abstract: This paper reports the results of experiments involving a 3-person coalition formation game with an ultimatum</field>
      <field key="bar" subkey="g">aining character. The grand coalition was always the efficient coalition decision, whereas the values of the 2-person</field>
      <field key="coa" subkey="l">itions are varied such that they lead to an efficiency loss in the range of 6.7 up to 30 percent. Furthermore, the 2-person</field>
      <field key="coa" subkey="l">ition implies social exclusion, since the not chosen member always receives a payoff of zero. Consistent with results</field>
      <field key="rep" subkey="o">rted in the literature on 2- person ultimatum bargaining experiments, negative reciprocity (i.e. punishment of unfair offers)</field>
      <field key="pla" subkey="y">s a crucial role in decision making. The hypothesis that selfishness and anticipated negative reciprocity by proposers</field>
      <field key="tog" subkey="e">ther with actual negative reciprocal behavior of responders lead to inefficient outcomes and social exclusion is strongly</field>
      <field key="sup" subkey="p">orted by the data. It turns out that a huge majority of proposers choose the inefficient and unfair 2-person coalition.</field>
      <field key="Pro" subkey="p">oser-induced efficiency losses vary between 5 and 20 percent, and one sixth to almost one third of the population is excluded</field>
      <field key="fro" subkey="m">participation.;</field>
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