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    <SEQUENTIAL>
      <record key="001" att1="001" value="LIB910459803" att2="LIB910459803">001   LIB910459803</record>
      <field key="037" subkey="x">englisch</field>
      <field key="050" subkey="x">Forschungsbericht</field>
      <field key="076" subkey="">Ökonomie</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="y">http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/eco/east/ro-56.pdf</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="z">Levinsky, Rene - et al., Voting Power and Coalition Formation: The Case of the Council of the EU (pdf)</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="y">http://ideas.repec.org/p/ihs/ihsrop/56.html</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="z">Institute for Advanced Studies. East European Series; 56 (RePEc)</field>
      <field key="100" subkey="">Levinsky, Rene</field>
      <field key="103" subkey="">CERGEI-EI, Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education of Charles University and Economics Institute of the Academy of</field>
      <field key="Sci" subkey="e">nces of the Czech Republic</field>
      <field key="104" subkey="a">Silarszky, Peter</field>
      <field key="107" subkey="">CERGEI-EI, Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education of Charles University and Economics Institute of the Academy of</field>
      <field key="Sci" subkey="e">nces of the Czech Republic</field>
      <field key="331" subkey="">Voting Power and Coalition Formation: The Case of the Council of the EU</field>
      <field key="403" subkey="">1. Ed.</field>
      <field key="410" subkey="">Wien</field>
      <field key="412" subkey="">Institut für Höhere Studien</field>
      <field key="425" subkey="">1998, March</field>
      <field key="433" subkey="">20 pp.</field>
      <field key="451" subkey="">Institut für Höhere Studien; Reihe Osteuropa; 56</field>
      <field key="461" subkey="">East European Series</field>
      <field key="544" subkey="">IHSRO 56</field>
      <field key="700" subkey="">D72</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">EU Enlargement</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">EU Decision Making</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">A Priori Unions</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Shapley Value</field>
      <field key="753" subkey="">Abstract: In this paper we study the distribution of power in the Council of the European Union (EU). The goal of this paper is</field>
      <field key="to" subkey="e">valuate the voting power of the member states after the entry of Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC). The analysis</field>
      <field key="is" subkey="b">ased on the Shapley-Shubik power index of simple cooperative games. Modified versions of the Shapley-Shubik index are used to</field>
      <field key="ana" subkey="l">yse the influence of sub-systems of the EU on the distribution of power in the decision making process.;</field>
    </SEQUENTIAL>
  </section>