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      <record key="001" att1="001" value="LIB910166307" att2="LIB910166307">001   LIB910166307</record>
      <field key="037" subkey="x">englisch</field>
      <field key="050" subkey="x">Forschungsbericht</field>
      <field key="076" subkey="">Sozialwissenschaft</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="y">http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/pol/pw_47.pdf</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="z">Johnson, Juliet, Path-Dependent Independence (pdf)</field>
      <field key="100" subkey="">Johnson, Juliet</field>
      <field key="103" subkey="">Department of Political Science, Loyola University Chicago</field>
      <field key="331" subkey="">Path-Dependent Independence</field>
      <field key="335" subkey="">The Central Bank of Russia in the 1990s</field>
      <field key="403" subkey="">1. Ed.</field>
      <field key="410" subkey="">Wien</field>
      <field key="412" subkey="">Institut für Höhere Studien</field>
      <field key="425" subkey="">1997, September</field>
      <field key="433" subkey="">31 pp.</field>
      <field key="451" subkey="">Institut für Höhere Studien; Reihe Politikwissenschaft; 47</field>
      <field key="461" subkey="">Political Science Series</field>
      <field key="517" subkey="c">from the Table of Contents: Central Bank Independence in Theory and Practice; Formal Legal Autonomy; The Origins of the CBR; The</field>
      <field key="Era" subkey="">of Autonomy; Policy Consequences; The Era of Stabilization; The Complexity of Change;</field>
      <field key="544" subkey="">IHSPW 47</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Central Banking</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Russia</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Institutionalism</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Independence</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Post-Communist Democracies</field>
      <field key="753" subkey="">Abstract: Independent central banks, because of their purported ability to restrain government officials from manipulating their</field>
      <field key="eco" subkey="n">omies in pursuit of short-term political goals, have been championed by scholars and policy makers alike as guarantors of</field>
      <field key="mac" subkey="r">oeconomic stability for emerging post-communist democracies. However, Russia's experience in the 1990s calls this argument</field>
      <field key="int" subkey="o">question. Although the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) was able to develop a significant degree of freedom from political</field>
      <field key="int" subkey="e">rference during its early years, its monetary policies at that time were anything but conservative and anti-inflationary.</field>
      <field key="The" subkey="n">, when the CBR's political autonomy began to erode after mid-1993 while its technical capabilities improved, its increasingly</field>
      <field key="mon" subkey="e">tarist actions began to appear more typical of an "independent" central bank and inflation receded accordingly. This should</field>
      <field key="lea" subkey="d">us to rethink our theories on central bank independence - both how we define independence and what we can and cannot expect</field>
      <field key="of" subkey="a">n independent central bank. Given the CBR's continuity of personnel, historical objectives, and technical capabilities, even</field>
      <field key="a p" subkey="o">litically autonomous CBR can not have been expected to internalize and implement new policy goalsovernight.;</field>
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