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      <record key="001" att1="001" value="LIB910113509" att2="LIB910113509">001   LIB910113509</record>
      <field key="037" subkey="x">englisch</field>
      <field key="050" subkey="x">Forschungsbericht</field>
      <field key="076" subkey="">Ökonomie</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="y">http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/eco/es-46.pdf</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="z">Stark, Oded, On the Evolution of Altruism (pdf)</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="y">http://ideas.repec.org/p/ihs/ihsesp/46.html</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="z">Institute for Advanced Studies. Economics Series; 46 (RePEc)</field>
      <field key="100" subkey="">Stark, Oded</field>
      <field key="103" subkey="">Department of Economics, University of Oslo</field>
      <field key="331" subkey="">On the Evolution of Altruism</field>
      <field key="403" subkey="">1. Ed.</field>
      <field key="410" subkey="">Wien</field>
      <field key="412" subkey="">Institut für Höhere Studien</field>
      <field key="425" subkey="">1997, June</field>
      <field key="433" subkey="">9 pp.</field>
      <field key="451" subkey="">Institut für Höhere Studien; Reihe Ökonomie; 46</field>
      <field key="451" subkey="h">Kunst, Robert M. (Ed.) ; Fisher, Walter (Ed.) ; Riedl, Arno (Ed.)</field>
      <field key="461" subkey="">Economics Series</field>
      <field key="544" subkey="">IHSES 46</field>
      <field key="700" subkey="">A13</field>
      <field key="700" subkey="">D00</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Altruism</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Evolution</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Imitation</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Equilibrium</field>
      <field key="753" subkey="">Abstract: We demonstrate how altruism can flourish in a population of nonaltruists. We assume that each individual plays a</field>
      <field key="one" subkey="-">shot prisoner's dilemma game with his or her sibling and that the probability than an individual survives to reproduce is</field>
      <field key="pro" subkey="p">ortional to his or her payoff in this game. We model the formation of couples and the rule of imitation of parents and of</field>
      <field key="non" subkey="p">arents. We then ask what happens to the proportion of altruists in the population. We specify a case where the unique and</field>
      <field key="sta" subkey="b">le equilibrium is one in which the entire population will consist of altruists.;</field>
    </SEQUENTIAL>
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