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      <record key="001" att1="001" value="LIB909453706" att2="LIB909453706">001   LIB909453706</record>
      <field key="037" subkey="x">englisch</field>
      <field key="050" subkey="x">Forschungsbericht</field>
      <field key="076" subkey="">Ökonomie</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="y">http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/eco/es-14.pdf</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="z">Fehr, Ernst - et al., Gift Exchange and Reciprocity in Competitive Experimental Markets (pdf)</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="y">http://ideas.repec.org/p/ihs/ihsesp/14.html</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="z">Institute for Advanced Studies. Economics Series; 14 (RePEc)</field>
      <field key="100" subkey="">Fehr, Ernst</field>
      <field key="103" subkey="">Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zürich</field>
      <field key="104" subkey="a">Kirchsteiger, Georg</field>
      <field key="107" subkey="">Department of Economics, University of Vienna</field>
      <field key="108" subkey="a">Riedl, Arno</field>
      <field key="111" subkey="">Department of Economics, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna</field>
      <field key="331" subkey="">Gift Exchange and Reciprocity in Competitive Experimental Markets</field>
      <field key="403" subkey="">1. Ed.</field>
      <field key="410" subkey="">Wien</field>
      <field key="412" subkey="">Institut für Höhere Studien</field>
      <field key="425" subkey="">1995, September</field>
      <field key="433" subkey="">24 pp., Data, 5 Figures</field>
      <field key="451" subkey="">Institut für Höhere Studien; Reihe Ökonomie; 14</field>
      <field key="451" subkey="h">Kunst, Robert M. (Ed.) ; Helmenstein, Christian (Ed.) ; Riedl, Arno (Ed.)</field>
      <field key="461" subkey="">Economics Series</field>
      <field key="544" subkey="">IHSES 14</field>
      <field key="700" subkey="">J41</field>
      <field key="700" subkey="">J64</field>
      <field key="700" subkey="">C91</field>
      <field key="700" subkey="">C92</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Gift Exchange</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Reciprocity</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Experiments</field>
      <field key="753" subkey="">Abstract: One of the outstanding results of three decades of laboratory market research is that under rather weak conditions</field>
      <field key="pri" subkey="c">es and quantities in competitive experimental markets converge to the competitive equilibrium. Yet, the design of these</field>
      <field key="exp" subkey="e">riments ruled out gift exchange or reciprocity motives, that is, subjects could not reciprocate for a gift. This paper</field>
      <field key="rep" subkey="o">rts the results of experiments which do not rule out reciprocal interactions between buyers and sellers. Sellers have the</field>
      <field key="opp" subkey="o">rtunity to choose quality levels which are above the levels enforceable by buyers. In principle they can, therefore, reward</field>
      <field key="buy" subkey="e">rs who offer them high prices. Yet, such reciprocating behaviour lowers sellers' monetary payoff and is, hence, not subgame</field>
      <field key="per" subkey="f">ect. The data reveal that a majority of sellers behave reciprocally and that this behaviour is anticipated by buyers. As a</field>
      <field key="res" subkey="u">lt, buyers are willing to pay prices which are substantially above sellers' reservation prices. These results indicate that</field>
      <field key="rec" subkey="i">procity motives may indeed be capable of driving a competitive experimental market permanently away from the competitive</field>
      <field key="out" subkey="c">ome. The data, therefore, support the gift exchange approach to the explanation of involuntary unemployment.;</field>
    </SEQUENTIAL>
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