<section name="raw">
    <SEQUENTIAL>
      <record key="001" att1="001" value="LIB907705509" att2="LIB907705509">001   LIB907705509</record>
      <field key="037" subkey="x">englisch</field>
      <field key="050" subkey="x">Forschungsbericht</field>
      <field key="076" subkey="">Ökonomie</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="y">http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/ihsfo/fo320.pdf</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="z">Bergstrom, Theodore C. - et al., How Altruism Can Prevail in an Evolutionary Environment (pdf)</field>
      <field key="100" subkey="">Bergstrom, Theodore C.</field>
      <field key="103" subkey="">Department of Economics, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA</field>
      <field key="104" subkey="a">Stark, Oded</field>
      <field key="107" subkey="">Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA</field>
      <field key="331" subkey="">How Altruism Can Prevail in an Evolutionary Environment</field>
      <field key="403" subkey="">1. Ed.</field>
      <field key="410" subkey="">Wien</field>
      <field key="412" subkey="">Institut für Höhere Studien</field>
      <field key="425" subkey="">1993, April</field>
      <field key="433" subkey="">10 pp.</field>
      <field key="451" subkey="">Institut für Höhere Studien; Forschungsberichte; 320</field>
      <field key="461" subkey="">Research Memorandum</field>
      <field key="544" subkey="">IHSFO 320</field>
      <field key="753" subkey="">Abstract: We study environments in which an individual gets a higher payoff from defecting than from cooperating and where</field>
      <field key="&quot;co" subkey="p">ies" of an individual are more likely to appear the higher is the individual's payoff. We demonstrate that even in</field>
      <field key="sin" subkey="g">le-shot prisoner's dilemma models (where cooperation benefits one's opponent at a cost to oneself), evolution can sustain</field>
      <field key="coo" subkey="p">erative behavior between relatives or neighbors. In addition, we show that selfish individuals who conciously choose their</field>
      <field key="act" subkey="i">ons may find it in their interest to be altruistic when there is some probability that their practices will be imitated. Both</field>
      <field key="gen" subkey="e">tic and cultural inheritance appear to be blunt instruments that do not operate on individuals in isolation. Those who</field>
      <field key="inh" subkey="e">rit a genetic tendency to cooperate are more likely than others to enjoy the benefits of cooperative siblings. Similarly with</field>
      <field key="cul" subkey="t">urel inheritance; altruism can prevail when individuals are likely to interact with others who share the same role model.;</field>
    </SEQUENTIAL>
  </section>