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      <record key="001" att1="001" value="LIB900210400" att2="LIB900210400">001   LIB900210400</record>
      <field key="037" subkey="x">englisch</field>
      <field key="050" subkey="x">Forschungsbericht</field>
      <field key="076" subkey="">Ökonomie</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="y">http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/ihsfo/fo16.pdf</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="z">shubik, martin, a two party system, general equilibrium and the voters' paradox (pdf)</field>
      <field key="100" subkey="">shubik, martin</field>
      <field key="331" subkey="">a two party system, general equilibrium and the voters' paradox</field>
      <field key="403" subkey="">1. ed.</field>
      <field key="410" subkey="">wien</field>
      <field key="412" subkey="">institut fuer hoehere studien</field>
      <field key="425" subkey="">1968, june</field>
      <field key="433" subkey="">19 pp.</field>
      <field key="451" subkey="">institut fuer hoehere studien; forschungsberichte; 16</field>
      <field key="544" subkey="">IHSFO 16</field>
      <field key="753" subkey="">abstract (introduction; abridged): this work was helped considerably by the work of anthony downs. although the models</field>
      <field key="con" subkey="s">tructed are somewhat more formal and the conclusions reached are somewhat different the approach to the study of the</field>
      <field key="pol" subkey="i">tical-economy of a democracy with competitive markets is much the same. the investigation is limited to the study of a two</field>
      <field key="par" subkey="t">y system in a very rudimentary form operating in an environment in which the average individual acts as a passive voter (i.e.</field>
      <field key="doe" subkey="s">not form coalitions, or act in any way other than to individually use his vote to maximize his own welfare). the individual</field>
      <field key="als" subkey="o">acts as a price taker in that part of society which can be represented as a competitive market. the model presented here is</field>
      <field key="str" subkey="i">pped down to its most abstract form. no attempt is made to defend its "realism". obviously much more detail and many more</field>
      <field key="&quot;fa" subkey="c">ts" of political and economic life must be added if it is to be presented as a model with immediate worth in application.</field>
      <field key="thi" subkey="s">is not the intention. the goal is to explore the implications of the highly simplified political model added to a general</field>
      <field key="equ" subkey="i">librium economic model. because the assumptions made to construct the model are critical and may be controversial a detailed</field>
      <field key="dis" subkey="c">ussion of them is now given. much of the writing on political parties, elections and government has been devoted to detailed</field>
      <field key="des" subkey="c">ription of process. attention is paid here to static models only. (...);</field>
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