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      <record key="001" att1="001" value="181047" att2="181047">001   181047</record>
      <field key="037" subkey="x">englisch</field>
      <field key="050" subkey="x">Buch</field>
      <field key="076" subkey="">Formalwissenschaft</field>
      <field key="100" subkey="">Nitzan, Shmuel</field>
      <field key="103" subkey="">Sir Issac Wolfson Professor of Economics, Bar-Ilan University, Israel</field>
      <field key="331" subkey="">Collective Preference and Choice</field>
      <field key="403" subkey="">1. Ed.</field>
      <field key="410" subkey="">Cambridge, New York, Melbourne</field>
      <field key="412" subkey="">Cambridge University Press</field>
      <field key="425" subkey="">2010</field>
      <field key="433" subkey="">xvii, 255 pp.</field>
      <field key="517" subkey="c">from the Table of Contents: Preface; Acknowledgments; Introduction: The reason for the problems; The relationship between</field>
      <field key="pre" subkey="f">erences and choice; Different Preferences: Do social preferences exist? Arrow's and Sen's impossibility theorems; The</field>
      <field key="des" subkey="i">rable decision rule. axiomatization; Rule selection based on compromise with the unanimity criterion; Paradoxes of voting;</field>
      <field key="Maj" subkey="o">rity tyranny; The problem of inefficient provision of public goods; Do individuals reveal their true preferences?;</field>
      <field key="Ide" subkey="n">ticalPreferences, Different Decisional Skills: Which rule is better. the expert rule or the simple; The optimal decision rule</field>
      <field key="und" subkey="e">r uncertain dichotomous choice; Bibliography;</field>
      <field key="540" subkey="">978-0-521-72213-1</field>
      <field key="544" subkey="">20155-A</field>
      <field key="700" subkey="b">302</field>
      <field key="700" subkey="b">Social interaction</field>
      <field key="710" subkey="">Group decision making -- Mathematical models</field>
      <field key="710" subkey="">Social choice -- Mathematical models</field>
    </SEQUENTIAL>
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