<section name="raw">
    <SEQUENTIAL>
      <record key="001" att1="001" value="179458" att2="179458">001   179458</record>
      <field key="037" subkey="x">englisch</field>
      <field key="050" subkey="x">Forschungsbericht</field>
      <field key="076" subkey="">Ökonomie</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="y">http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/eco/es-245.pdf</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="z">Brandner, Peter - et al., Unifying EU Representation at the IMF Executive Board (pdf)</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="y">http://ideas.repec.org/p/ihs/ihsesp/245.html</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="z">Institute for Advanced Studies. Economics Series; 245 (RePEc)</field>
      <field key="100" subkey="">Brandner, Peter</field>
      <field key="103" subkey="">Federal Ministry of Finance, Austria</field>
      <field key="104" subkey="a">Grech, Harald</field>
      <field key="107" subkey="">Oesterreichische Nationalbank</field>
      <field key="108" subkey="a">Paterson, Iain</field>
      <field key="111" subkey="">Department of Economics and Finance, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, Austria</field>
      <field key="331" subkey="">Unifying EU Representation at the IMF Executive Board</field>
      <field key="335" subkey="">A Voting and Veto Power Analysis</field>
      <field key="403" subkey="">1. Ed.</field>
      <field key="410" subkey="">Wien</field>
      <field key="412" subkey="">Institut für Höhere Studien</field>
      <field key="425" subkey="">2009, November</field>
      <field key="433" subkey="">36 pp.</field>
      <field key="451" subkey="">Institut für Höhere Studien; Reihe Ökonomie; 245</field>
      <field key="451" subkey="h">Kunst, Robert M. (Ed.) ; Fisher, Walter (Assoc. Ed.) ; Ritzberger, Klaus (Assoc. Ed.)</field>
      <field key="461" subkey="">Economics Series</field>
      <field key="517" subkey="c">from the Table of Contents: Introduction; Overview of Governance Structures at the IMF; External Representation of the EU and EU</field>
      <field key="Rep" subkey="r">esentation at the IMF; Voting Power Analysis and Consolidating EU Representation; Empirical Results; Summary and Conclusions;</field>
      <field key="Ref" subkey="e">rences; Appendixes;</field>
      <field key="542" subkey="">1605-7996</field>
      <field key="544" subkey="">IHSES 245</field>
      <field key="700" subkey="">C71</field>
      <field key="700" subkey="">D71</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">International Monetary Fund</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">European Union</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Voting power analysis</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Veto power</field>
      <field key="753" subkey="">Abstract: The consequences of consolidating EU representation at the IMF Executive Board by regrouping the 27 Member States into</field>
      <field key="two" subkey="">EU constituencies, euro area and non-euro area, are discussed. In particular we contrast voting power as proposed</field>
      <field key="byP" subkey="e">nrose-Banzhaf (PBI) and Shapley-Shubik (SSI), and other respectively related measures of blocking (or veto) power and</field>
      <field key="dec" subkey="i">sion efficiency as proposed by Coleman and Paterson. Hitherto, IMF-specific literature is PBI-based. However, theoretical</field>
      <field key="rea" subkey="s">ons and empirical plausibility arguments for the SSI are compelling. The (SSI) voting power of the two large constituencies –</field>
      <field key="U.S" subkey=".">A. and euro area – reflects their corresponding voting shares over a range of majority thresholds, whereas PBI voting power</field>
      <field key="red" subkey="u">ces to only half of vote share at the majority threshold of 85% needed for some Executive Board decisions. SSI-related</field>
      <field key="est" subkey="i">mates of veto power are generally lower than the Coleman indices. Correspondingly, the efficiency of collective</field>
      <field key="dec" subkey="i">sion-making is considerably underestimated by the Coleman measure.;</field>
    </SEQUENTIAL>
  </section>