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      <record key="001" att1="001" value="152213" att2="152213">001   152213</record>
      <field key="037" subkey="x">englisch</field>
      <field key="050" subkey="x">Forschungsbericht</field>
      <field key="076" subkey="">Ökonomie</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="y">http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/eco/es-151.pdf</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="z">Coricelli, Giorgio - et al., Partner Selection in Public Goods Experiments (pdf)</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="y">http://ideas.repec.org/p/ihs/ihsesp/151.html</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="z">Institute for Advanced Studies. Economics Series; 151 (RePEc)</field>
      <field key="100" subkey="">Coricelli, Giorgio</field>
      <field key="103" subkey="">Department of Economics, University of Siena</field>
      <field key="104" subkey="a">Fehr, Dietmar</field>
      <field key="107" subkey="">Department of Economics and Finance, Institute for Advanced Studies</field>
      <field key="108" subkey="a">Fellner, Gerlinde</field>
      <field key="111" subkey="">Strategic Interaction Group, Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems</field>
      <field key="331" subkey="">Partner Selection in Public Goods Experiments</field>
      <field key="403" subkey="">1. Ed.</field>
      <field key="410" subkey="">Wien</field>
      <field key="412" subkey="">Institut für Höhere Studien</field>
      <field key="425" subkey="">2004, March</field>
      <field key="433" subkey="">26 pp., Appendix</field>
      <field key="451" subkey="">Institut für Höhere Studien; Reihe Ökonomie; 151</field>
      <field key="451" subkey="h">Kunst, Robert M. (Ed.) ; Fisher, Walter (Assoc. Ed.) ; Ritzberger, Klaus (Assoc. Ed.)</field>
      <field key="461" subkey="">Economics Series</field>
      <field key="517" subkey="c">from the Table of Contents: Introduction; Related literature; Experimental design and procedure; Results; Discussion; Appendix;</field>
      <field key="542" subkey="">1605-7996</field>
      <field key="544" subkey="">IHSES 151</field>
      <field key="700" subkey="">C91</field>
      <field key="700" subkey="">D62</field>
      <field key="700" subkey="">H41</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Public goods</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Partner selection</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Experimental economics</field>
      <field key="753" subkey="">Abstract: This paper studies the effect of introducing costly partner selection for the voluntary contribution to a public good.</field>
      <field key="Sub" subkey="j">ects participate in six sequences of five rounds of a two-person public good game in partner design. At the end of each</field>
      <field key="seq" subkey="u">ence, subjects can select a new partner out of six group members. Unidirectional and bidirectional partner selection</field>
      <field key="mec" subkey="h">anisms are introduced and compared to controls with random partner rematching. Results demonstrate significantly higher</field>
      <field key="coo" subkey="p">eration in correspondence to unidirectional partner selection than to bidirectional selection and random rematching. Average</field>
      <field key="mon" subkey="e">tary effort for being able to choose a partner is substantially high and remains stable.;</field>
    </SEQUENTIAL>
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