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      <record key="001" att1="001" value="148558" att2="148558">001   148558</record>
      <field key="037" subkey="x">englisch</field>
      <field key="050" subkey="x">Forschungsbericht</field>
      <field key="076" subkey="">Ökonomie</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="y">http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/eco/es-135.pdf</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="z">Chirinko, Robert S. - et al., A Revealed Preference Approach (pdf)</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="y">http://ideas.repec.org/p/ihs/ihsesp/135.html</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="z">Institute for Advanced Studies. Economics Series; 135 (RePEc)</field>
      <field key="100" subkey="">Chirinko, Robert S.</field>
      <field key="103" subkey="">Department of Economics, Emory University</field>
      <field key="104" subkey="a">Schaller, Huntley</field>
      <field key="107" subkey="">Department of Economics, Carleton University</field>
      <field key="331" subkey="">A Revealed Preference Approach</field>
      <field key="335" subkey="">To Understanding Corporate Governance Problems: Evidence From Canada</field>
      <field key="403" subkey="">1. Ed.</field>
      <field key="410" subkey="">Wien</field>
      <field key="412" subkey="">Institut für Höhere Studien</field>
      <field key="425" subkey="">2003, July</field>
      <field key="433" subkey="">35 pp.</field>
      <field key="451" subkey="">Institut für Höhere Studien; Reihe Ökonomie; 135</field>
      <field key="451" subkey="h">Kunst, Robert M. (Ed.) ; Fisher, Walter (Assoc. Ed.) ; Ritzberger, Klaus (Assoc. Ed.)</field>
      <field key="461" subkey="">Economics Series</field>
      <field key="517" subkey="c">from the Table of Contents: Introduction; The Net Present Value and the Euler Investment; The Econometric Equation and Estimation</field>
      <field key="Str" subkey="a">tegy; The Canadian Dataset; Assessing Corporate Governance Problems; Curing Free Cash Flow Problems?; Capital Structure and</field>
      <field key="Dis" subkey="c">ount Rates; Summary and Conclusions; Appendixes;</field>
      <field key="542" subkey="">1605-7996</field>
      <field key="544" subkey="">IHSES 135</field>
      <field key="700" subkey="">G3</field>
      <field key="700" subkey="">E2</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Corporate governance</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Business investment</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Discount rates</field>
      <field key="753" subkey="">Abstract: Empire-building by managers implies that they use a lower effective discount rate in making investment decisions. We</field>
      <field key="use" subkey="">actual investment decisions to measure the gap between the manager's effective discount rate and the market rate. Our</field>
      <field key="emp" subkey="i">rical work is based on panel data for 193 Canadian firms. Distinctive institutional features, such as interrelated groups of</field>
      <field key="Can" subkey="a">dian firms and concentrated share ownership, allow us to quantify the sensitivity of effective discount rates and governance</field>
      <field key="pro" subkey="b">lems to these institutional control mechanisms. For the firms most likely to be affected by the agency problems highlighted</field>
      <field key="by" subkey="J">ensen (1986), estimated discount rates are 350-400 basis points less than the market rate, supporting the FreeCash Flow view</field>
      <field key="tha" subkey="t">unresolved corporate governance problems distort firm behavior. Firms in our sample that face Free Cash Flow problems have a</field>
      <field key="sto" subkey="c">k of fixed capital approximately 7% to 22% higher than would prevail under value maximizing behavior.;</field>
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