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      <record key="001" att1="001" value="145479" att2="145479">001   145479</record>
      <field key="037" subkey="x">englisch</field>
      <field key="050" subkey="x">Forschungsbericht</field>
      <field key="076" subkey="">Ökonomie</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="y">http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/eco/es-123.pdf</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="z">Stark, Oded, Cooperation and Wealth (pdf)</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="y">http://ideas.repec.org/p/ihs/ihsesp/123.html</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="z">Institute for Advanced Studies. Economics Series; 123 (RePEc)</field>
      <field key="100" subkey="">Stark, Oded</field>
      <field key="103" subkey="">University of Bonn and University of Vienna</field>
      <field key="331" subkey="">Cooperation and Wealth</field>
      <field key="403" subkey="">1. Ed.</field>
      <field key="410" subkey="">Wien</field>
      <field key="412" subkey="">Institut für Höhere Studien</field>
      <field key="425" subkey="">2002, October</field>
      <field key="433" subkey="">10 pp.</field>
      <field key="451" subkey="">Institut für Höhere Studien; Reihe Ökonomie; 123</field>
      <field key="451" subkey="h">Kunst, Robert M. (Ed.) ; Fisher, Walter (Assoc. Ed.) ; Ritzberger, Klaus (Assoc. Ed.)</field>
      <field key="461" subkey="">Economics Series</field>
      <field key="517" subkey="c">from the Table of Contents: Introduction; The game and the payoffs; The types and their expected payoffs; Equilibrium with</field>
      <field key="def" subkey="e">ctors and testing cooperators but without non-testing cooperators; The relationship between the equilibrium fraction of</field>
      <field key="coo" subkey="p">erators in a population and a population's level of wealth; Robustness of the cooperation-wealth relationship when the</field>
      <field key="tes" subkey="t">ing cooperators are somewhat adventurous; Conclusion;</field>
      <field key="542" subkey="">1605-7996</field>
      <field key="544" subkey="">IHSES 123</field>
      <field key="700" subkey="">A13</field>
      <field key="700" subkey="">C70</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Equilibrium fraction of cooperators</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Population's level of wealth</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Single-shot prisoner's dilemma game</field>
      <field key="750" subkey="h">References: Binmore, Ken. 1998. Game Theory and the Social Contract II: Just Playing. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. -- Cook, Karen S.</field>
      <field key="and" subkey="">Hardin, Russell. 2001. 'Norms of Cooperativeness and Networks of Trust' in Hechter, Michael and Opp, Karl-Dieter (eds.)</field>
      <field key="Soc" subkey="i">al Norms. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, pp. 327-347. -- Stark, Oded. 1999. Altruism and Beyond: An Economic Analysis of</field>
      <field key="Tra" subkey="n">sfers and Exchanges Within Families and Groups. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.;</field>
      <field key="753" subkey="">Abstract: We calculate the equilibrium fraction of cooperators in a population in which payoffs accrue from playing a single-shot</field>
      <field key="pri" subkey="s">oner's dilemma game. Individuals who are hardwired as cooperators or defectors are randomly matched into pairs,</field>
      <field key="and" subkey="c">ooperators are able to perfectly find out the type of a partner to a game by incurring a recognition cost. We show that the</field>
      <field key="equ" subkey="i">librium fraction of cooperators relates negatively to the population's level of wealth.;</field>
    </SEQUENTIAL>
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