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      <field key="037" subkey="x">englisch</field>
      <field key="050" subkey="x">Aufsatz, Zeitschrift</field>
      <field key="076" subkey="">Formalwissenschaft</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="y">http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001820000054</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="z">Clark, Kenneth - et al., When are Nash equilibria self-enforcing? (pdf)</field>
      <field key="100" subkey="">Clark, Kenneth</field>
      <field key="103" subkey="">School of Economic Studies, Faculty of Economic and Social Studies, University of Manchester, Manchester, UK</field>
      <field key="104" subkey="a">Kay, Stephen</field>
      <field key="107" subkey="">School of Economic Studies, Faculty of Economic and Social Studies, University of Manchester, Manchester, UK</field>
      <field key="108" subkey="a">Sefton, Martin</field>
      <field key="111" subkey="">School of Economic Studies, Faculty of Economic and Social Studies, University of Manchester, Manchester, UK</field>
      <field key="331" subkey="">When are Nash equilibria self-enforcing?</field>
      <field key="335" subkey="">An experimental analysis</field>
      <field key="542" subkey="">0020-7276</field>
      <field key="542" subkey="w">1432-1270</field>
      <field key="544" subkey="n">IJOGT29.2000(4);3</field>
      <field key="590" subkey="">International Journal of Game Theory</field>
      <field key="596" subkey="a">29.2000, issue 4, 495 - 515</field>
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