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      <record key="001" att1="001" value="138843" att2="138843">001   138843</record>
      <field key="037" subkey="x">englisch</field>
      <field key="050" subkey="x">Forschungsbericht</field>
      <field key="076" subkey="">Ökonomie</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="y">http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/eco/es-101.pdf</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="z">Drost, André  - et al., Social Security as a Monopoly (pdf)</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="y">http://ideas.repec.org/p/ihs/ihsesp/101.html</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="z">Institute for Advanced Studies. Economics Series; 101 (RePEc)</field>
      <field key="100" subkey="">Drost, André</field>
      <field key="103" subkey="">Department of Economics, University of Cologne</field>
      <field key="104" subkey="a">Felderer, Bernhard</field>
      <field key="107" subkey="">Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna</field>
      <field key="331" subkey="">Social Security as a Monopoly</field>
      <field key="403" subkey="">1. Ed.</field>
      <field key="410" subkey="">Wien</field>
      <field key="412" subkey="">Institut für Höhere Studien</field>
      <field key="425" subkey="">2001, July</field>
      <field key="433" subkey="">19 pp.</field>
      <field key="451" subkey="">Institut für Höhere Studien; Reihe Ökonomie; 101</field>
      <field key="451" subkey="h">Kunst, Robert M. (Ed.) ; Fisher, Walter (Assoc. Ed.) ; Ritzberger, Klaus (Assoc. Ed.)</field>
      <field key="461" subkey="">Economics Series</field>
      <field key="517" subkey="c">from the Table of Contents: Introduction; Omitting Social Security; Introducing Social Security; Modifying Social Security;</field>
      <field key="Con" subkey="c">lusion; Appendixes;</field>
      <field key="542" subkey="">1605-7996</field>
      <field key="544" subkey="">IHSES 101</field>
      <field key="700" subkey="">H55</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Social security</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Public pensions</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Political economy</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Monopolistic labor market</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Nash bargaining solution</field>
      <field key="753" subkey="">Abstract: The typical social security program is designed as follows: (1) It is organized as a pay-as-you-go system. (2) It is</field>
      <field key="fin" subkey="a">nced with a payroll tax. (3) Employers and employees share the tax. (4) Benefits are largely independent of asset income. (5)</field>
      <field key="Ben" subkey="e">fits are increasing with the taxes paid. (6) Benefits induce retirement. We present a model that can explain these stylized</field>
      <field key="fac" subkey="t">s. Our model refers to an economy where workers want to monopolize the labor market. For this purpose, they bring about a</field>
      <field key="soc" subkey="i">al security act, which requires old workers to retire and young workers to pay transfers to retirees. The first prescription</field>
      <field key="ser" subkey="v">es to reduce labor supply in order to realize a monopoly gain. The second prescription serves to give oldworkers share to the</field>
      <field key="gai" subkey="n">. As we will show, the social security program emerging in our model is similar to the typical program described above.;</field>
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