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      <record key="001" att1="001" value="LIB910822703" att2="LIB910822703">001   LIB910822703</record>
      <field key="037" subkey="x">englisch</field>
      <field key="050" subkey="x">Aufsatz, Zeitschrift</field>
      <field key="076" subkey="">Formalwissenschaft</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="y">http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001820050100</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="z">Davis, Douglas D. - et al., Equilibrium cooperation in two-stage games: Experimental evidence (pdf)</field>
      <field key="100" subkey="">Davis, Douglas D.</field>
      <field key="103" subkey="">Department of Economics, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA, USA</field>
      <field key="104" subkey="a">Holt, Charles A.</field>
      <field key="107" subkey="">Department of Economics, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA, USA</field>
      <field key="331" subkey="">Equilibrium cooperation in two-stage games: Experimental evidence</field>
      <field key="542" subkey="">0020-7276</field>
      <field key="542" subkey="w">1432-1270</field>
      <field key="544" subkey="n">IJOGT28.1999(1);7</field>
      <field key="590" subkey="">International Journal of Game Theory</field>
      <field key="596" subkey="a">28.1999, issue 1, 89 - 109</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Experimental economics</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Renegotiation proof equilibria</field>
    </SEQUENTIAL>
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