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      <record key="001" att1="001" value="LIB90970580X" att2="LIB90970580X">001   LIB90970580X</record>
      <field key="037" subkey="x">englisch</field>
      <field key="050" subkey="x">Forschungsbericht</field>
      <field key="076" subkey="">Ökonomie</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="y">http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/eco/es-31.pdf</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="z">Grossman, Gene M. - et al., Electoral Competition with Policy Compromise (pdf)</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="y">http://ideas.repec.org/p/ihs/ihsesp/31.html</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="z">Institute for Advanced Studies. Economics Series; 31 (RePEc)</field>
      <field key="100" subkey="">Grossman, Gene M.</field>
      <field key="103" subkey="">Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University</field>
      <field key="104" subkey="a">Helpman, Elhanan</field>
      <field key="107" subkey="">The Eitan Berglas School of Economics, Tel Aviv University</field>
      <field key="331" subkey="">Electoral Competition with Policy Compromise</field>
      <field key="403" subkey="">1. Ed.</field>
      <field key="410" subkey="">Wien</field>
      <field key="412" subkey="">Institut für Höhere Studien</field>
      <field key="425" subkey="">1996, May</field>
      <field key="433" subkey="">36 pp., Figures</field>
      <field key="451" subkey="">Institut für Höhere Studien; Reihe Ökonomie; 31</field>
      <field key="451" subkey="h">Kunst, Robert M. (Ed.) ; Helmenstein, Christian (Ed.) ; Riedl, Arno (Ed.)</field>
      <field key="461" subkey="">Economics Series</field>
      <field key="544" subkey="">IHSES 31</field>
      <field key="700" subkey="">D72</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Electoral Competition</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Special Interest Groups</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Voting Behavior</field>
      <field key="753" subkey="">Abstract: We study the electoral competition between two parties vying for seats in a legislature. The electorate includes</field>
      <field key="kno" subkey="w">ledgeable voters and impressionable voters, the latter susceptible to electioneering activities. A special interest group</field>
      <field key="pro" subkey="v">ides campaign financing in exchange for influence over the platforms. The parties take positions on two issues, one on which</field>
      <field key="the" subkey="i">r divergent platforms are fixed and another pliable issue where their announcements are used to woo dollars and votes. The</field>
      <field key="int" subkey="e">rest group contributes with the knowledge that the final policies will be a compromise between the positions of the two</field>
      <field key="par" subkey="t">ies.We examine two modes of voting behavior. When knowledgeable voters vote sincerely, the parties' positions on thepliable</field>
      <field key="iss" subkey="u">e diverge, and the more popular party caters more to the special interest group. When knowledgeable voters vote strategically</field>
      <field key=", t" subkey="h">e interest group often induces the parties to announce identical pliable platforms. We investigate the determinants of the</field>
      <field key="pla" subkey="t">forms, contributions, vote counts, and policy compromise, and consider how changes in legislative institutions might affect</field>
      <field key="the" subkey="s">e outcomes.;</field>
    </SEQUENTIAL>
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