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      <record key="001" att1="001" value="185073" att2="185073">001   185073</record>
      <field key="037" subkey="x">englisch</field>
      <field key="050" subkey="x">Forschungsbericht</field>
      <field key="076" subkey="">Politikwissenschaft</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="y">http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/pol/pw_127.pdf</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="z">Finke, Daniel - et al., Parliamentary Scrutiny of EU Law Proposals in Denmark (pdf)</field>
      <field key="100" subkey="">Finke, Daniel</field>
      <field key="103" subkey="">Institut für Politische Wissenschaft, University of Heidelberg</field>
      <field key="104" subkey="a">Melzer, Marius</field>
      <field key="331" subkey="">Parliamentary Scrutiny of EU Law Proposals in Denmark</field>
      <field key="335" subkey="">Why do Governments request a Negotiation Mandate?</field>
      <field key="403" subkey="">1. Ed.</field>
      <field key="410" subkey="">Wien</field>
      <field key="412" subkey="">Institut für Höhere Studien</field>
      <field key="425" subkey="">2012, February</field>
      <field key="433" subkey="">33 pp.</field>
      <field key="451" subkey="">Institut für Höhere Studien; Reihe Politikwissenschaft; 127</field>
      <field key="451" subkey="h">Pollak, Johannes (Ed.) ; Becker, Maren (Assoc. Ed.)</field>
      <field key="461" subkey="">Political Science Series</field>
      <field key="517" subkey="c">from the Table of Contents: Introduction; The Role of National Parliaments in EU Politics; Parliamentary Scrutiny of EU Proposals</field>
      <field key="in" subkey="D">enmark; Who calls for a Negotiation Mandate?; Empirics; Independent Variables; Conclusions; References; Appendix;</field>
      <field key="542" subkey="">1605-8003</field>
      <field key="544" subkey="">IHSPW 127</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">European Union</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Denmark</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Coalition building</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Parliamentary scrutiny</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Minority government</field>
      <field key="753" subkey="">Abstract: Political scientists have been concerned about the loss of power of national parliaments through the shift of</field>
      <field key="com" subkey="p">etences to the EU level. In this respect the Danish system of parliamentary scrutiny has been recommended as being highly</field>
      <field key="eff" subkey="e">ctive. In this paper, we explain why the Folketing issues negotiation mandates on some EU law proposals whereas the</field>
      <field key="gov" subkey="e">rnment can freely chose its negotiation position on other proposals. Our empirical analysis of Danish scrutiny decision</field>
      <field key="bet" subkey="w">een 2006 and 2008 uncovers three answers. First, in contrast to other scrutiny measures, most of which can be initiated by</field>
      <field key="sin" subkey="g">le party groups, the issuance of negotiation mandates is a collective decision. Specifically, it requires the consent of a</field>
      <field key="maj" subkey="o">rity of deputies in the Folketing. As a consequence, the position of the minority government must win the support of a third</field>
      <field key="par" subkey="t">y. This third party tends to requests a negotiation mandate if it fears that collusion between the government and its</field>
      <field key="int" subkey="e">rnational partners might violate its interests. Second, the leading minister requests a negotiation mandate if a majority of</field>
      <field key="Dan" subkey="i">sh parties stand united against an adverse majority in the Council. Third, the coalition partner requests a negotiation</field>
      <field key="man" subkey="d">ate to control the leading minister in case of significant intra coalition dissent.;</field>
    </SEQUENTIAL>
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