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    <SEQUENTIAL>
      <record key="001" att1="001" value="179345" att2="179345">001   179345</record>
      <field key="037" subkey="x">englisch</field>
      <field key="050" subkey="x">Buch</field>
      <field key="076" subkey="">Politikwissenschaft</field>
      <field key="100" subkey="">Kedar, Orit</field>
      <field key="103" subkey="">Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology</field>
      <field key="331" subkey="">Voting for Policy, Not Parties</field>
      <field key="335" subkey="">How Voters Compensate for Power Sharing</field>
      <field key="403" subkey="">1. Ed.</field>
      <field key="410" subkey="">Cambridge, New York, Melbourne</field>
      <field key="412" subkey="">Cambridge University Press</field>
      <field key="425" subkey="">2009</field>
      <field key="433" subkey="">xiv, 220 pp.</field>
      <field key="451" subkey="">Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics</field>
      <field key="451" subkey="h">Levi, Margaret (Ed.) ; Thelen, Kathleen (Ass. Ed.) ; Wibbels, Erik (Ass. Ed.)</field>
      <field key="517" subkey="c">from the Table of Contents: Acknowledgments; Voting for Policy: Introduction. Institutional Sources of Voter Choice; A Theory of</field>
      <field key="Com" subkey="p">ensatory Vote; Empirical Evidence. How Voters Compensate for Diffusion of Power: Compensatory Vote in Parliamentary</field>
      <field key="Dem" subkey="o">cracies; Balancing Strong (and Weak) Presidents; Compensatory Vote in Federations. Evidence from Germany; Theoretical</field>
      <field key="Imp" subkey="l">ications: Conclusions;</field>
      <field key="540" subkey="">978-0-521-76457-5</field>
      <field key="544" subkey="">20065-A</field>
      <field key="700" subkey="b">324</field>
      <field key="700" subkey="b">The political process</field>
      <field key="710" subkey="">Voting</field>
      <field key="710" subkey="">Political parties</field>
      <field key="710" subkey="">Political planning</field>
      <field key="710" subkey="">Representative government and representation</field>
      <field key="710" subkey="">Public opinion</field>
      <field key="710" subkey="">Comparative government</field>
    </SEQUENTIAL>
  </section>