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    <SEQUENTIAL>
      <record key="001" att1="001" value="144345" att2="144345">001   144345</record>
      <field key="037" subkey="x">englisch</field>
      <field key="050" subkey="x">Forschungsbericht</field>
      <field key="076" subkey="">Ökonomie</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="y">http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/eco/es-119.pdf</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="z">Blume, Lawrence, Stigma and Social Control (pdf)</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="y">http://ideas.repec.org/p/ihs/ihsesp/119.html</field>
      <field key="079" subkey="z">Institute for Advanced Studies. Economics Series; 119 (RePEc)</field>
      <field key="100" subkey="">Blume, Lawrence</field>
      <field key="103" subkey="">Department of Economics, Cornell University</field>
      <field key="331" subkey="">Stigma and Social Control</field>
      <field key="403" subkey="">1. Ed.</field>
      <field key="410" subkey="">Wien</field>
      <field key="412" subkey="">Institut für Höhere Studien</field>
      <field key="425" subkey="">2002, July</field>
      <field key="433" subkey="">38 pp.</field>
      <field key="451" subkey="">Institut für Höhere Studien; Reihe Ökonomie; 119</field>
      <field key="451" subkey="h">Kunst, Robert M. (Ed.) ; Fisher, Walter (Assoc. Ed.) ; Ritzberger, Klaus (Assoc. Ed.)</field>
      <field key="461" subkey="">Economics Series</field>
      <field key="517" subkey="c">from the Table of Contents: Introduction; The Model; Individual Choice and Social Equilibrium; The Equilibrium Tagging Process;</field>
      <field key="Con" subkey="c">lusion; Proofs;</field>
      <field key="542" subkey="">1605-7996</field>
      <field key="544" subkey="">IHSES 119</field>
      <field key="700" subkey="">C730</field>
      <field key="700" subkey="">Z130</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Crime</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Stigma</field>
      <field key="720" subkey="">Social norms</field>
      <field key="753" subkey="">Abstract: Social interactions provide a set of incentives for regulating individual behavior. Chief among these is stigma, the</field>
      <field key="sta" subkey="t">us loss and discrimination that results from the display of stigmatized attributes or behaviors. The stigmatization</field>
      <field key="ofb" subkey="e">havior is the enforcement mechanism behind social norms. This paper models the incentive effects of stigmatization in the</field>
      <field key="con" subkey="t">ext of undertaking criminal acts. Stigma is a flow cost of uncertain duration which varies negatively with the number of</field>
      <field key="sti" subkey="g">matized individuals. Criminal opportunities arrive randomly and an equilibrium model describes the conditions under which</field>
      <field key="eac" subkey="h">individual chooses the behavior that, if detected, is stigmatized. The comparative static analysis of stigma costs differs</field>
      <field key="fro" subkey="m">that of conventional penalties. One surprising result with important policy implications is that stigma costs of long</field>
      <field key="dur" subkey="a">tion will lead to increased crime rates.;</field>
    </SEQUENTIAL>
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